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vs.
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BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
MAURINE TAYLOR

N A T U R E OF T H E CASE
The Plaintiff, Maurine Taylor, commenced this
action to recover damages suffered by her when she, as
an invitee of the defendant, through the alleged negligence of the defendant fell on the premises of the defendant.
DISPOSITION I N T H E L O W E R COURT
The case was tried to a jury and a verdict for the
plaintiff was returned by the jury. Upon motion by
the defendant, the Court set aside the verdict and entered judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the
verdict.
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N A T U R E OF R E L I E F SOUGHT
ON A P P E A L
The plaintiff seeks to have the granting of the
motion to set aside the verdict reversed and have the
judgment on the verdict reinstated.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
The defendant, Keith O'Brien, Inc., operates a
general department store on the southeast corner of
21st South and Highland Drive in Salt Lake City. The
store caters to the general public. The store has entrance ways from the parking lot immediately east of
the store and one on Highland Drive. The Highland
Drive entry is recessed through an open corridor of
about eight feet until the doors are reached.
At about 11:00 o'clock a.m. on February 4, 1972,
the plaintiff entered the store by the entrance from the
parking lot. She entered the store to purchase some
stockings. She made her purchase of two pairs of
stockings and proceeded to leave the store by way of
the Highland Drive exit. She opened the exit door,
took one step into the vestibule, slipped and fell, the
impact being on her knees primarily. Trans. 5, R167.
After the fall, Mrs. Taylor sat on a bench just outside the alcove until she regained her composure. She
then went into the store to report the fall. A Mrs.
Hill was at a cash register near the exit. Mrs. Taylor
told Mrs. Hill of the accident and requested that she,
Mrs. Hill, accompany her to examine the vestibule,
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which they did. Mrs. Hill agreed with Mrs. Taylor
that the vestibule should be swept. Mrs. Hill thereafter called "someone" to come and clean the entrance
up which was done. Trans. 27, RI89. It was found
that a black substance was present on the floor.
The above facts are undisputed.
There seems to be some conflict as to the conversation between Mrs. Hill and Mrs. Taylor, relative to
the presence of a broom in the area for the express purpose of keeping the vestibule clean. Trans. 9,-R171.
Mrs. Hill did not remember the conversation relative
to the broom. Evidently the jury believed the version
as recited by the plaintiff.
Mr. Beltz, the manager of the store, testified that
the instructions were that the area be swept every morning before the store opened. Trans. 46, R207. There
is no evidence that the area was swept the morning of
the accident. There is no evidence that the grayishblack substance found on the floor was ever analyzed.
There is testimony by Mrs. Hill that we feel can be
construed as showing that the defendant's employees
were aware that the black substance was present after
a snow storm and that it was put down by the street department. Trans. 31, 32, R193-194.
ARGUMENT
The sole question presented in this appeal is was
the defendant negligent in maintaining its premises and
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was there sufficient evidence for the jury to find negligence.
I t is apparent from the verdict of the jury that they
must have believed the plaintiff's testimony. I t is axiomatic that the jury is the sole judge of the facts and
the credibility of the witnesses and they were so instructed as to all of the elements of conduct they must find
before they could return a verdict for the plaintiff.
The authorities relied upon by the defendant in
support of its motions for a directed verdict and for
dismissal notwithstanding the verdict are all distinguishable because of one factual element which occurs
in each case and that is that the cause of the fall was an
article that had been placed upon the floor.
Mawine D. Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Company, 3 U.
2d 364, 284 P . 2d 477. I n this case, the cause of the
fall was a small puddle of water on the floor. The
water was of unknown origin.
Ha7iipton v. Rowley, 10 U. 2d 169, 350 P.2d 151.
The cause of this fall was a small rock on the step of
defendant's premises. The placement of the rock was
unknown.
Koer v. May fair Markets, 19 U. 2d 339, 431 P .
2d 566. A grape in an aisle of the store caused this fall.
There was no evidence as to how the grape got there or
how long it had been there.
4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The cause of the fall in the case now before the
Court was a black substance that seemed to spread on
the vestibule. The fair inference is that the substance
came in the vestibule when the road crews attended to
the snow and ice outside the entrance-way and it was a
condition which was recognized by the defendant and
ordinarily guarded against.
The case of De Weese v. J. C. Penney Company,
5 U. 2d 116, 297 P . 2d 898, factually is more in point
with the case now before the Court.
In the De Weese case, there was evidence that a
terrazzo entryway became slippery when wet and that
defendant had mats which ordinarily were put in place
at such times. The law cited in this case we deem to be
the law of this case. A t page 121 of the Utah citation
the Court said:
"The argument is made that the effect of affirmance of this judgment will be to make stores
such as defendant insurers of the safety of their
patrons, which argument we reject. The only
basis upon which liability can be predicated is
negligence. The standard upon which negligence is gauged is that of ordinary, reasonable
care under the circumstances, which standard it
is peculiarly fitting that juries determine. I t is
to be borne in mind that we are not holding that
the defendant's conduct amounted to negligence
as a matter of law. W e are only required to
determine whether there was any legitimate
basis in the evidence upon which reasonable
minds could believe that the defendant failed to

5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

meet its standard of reasonable care under the
circumstances for the safety of its customers."
W e wish to point out that the jury had before it
testimony that Mrs. Hill, an employee of the defendant, agreed with the plaintiff that the area needed
sweeping and had the corridor swept. The manager
of the store was present when it was swept. The implication from all the testimony is that the presence of the
"black subtance" was not unusual. There is also testimony that defendant had a broom in the immediate
vicinity to be used to keep the area clean.
The defendant did not call any witnesses to testify
that it was unusual for the "black substance" to be found
in the area. The testimony is that the entranceway was
supposed to be swept every day. The person or persons who did the sweeping would know of an unusual
condition and could testify as to the usual condition.
The defendant also had the opportunity to have the
substance found on the floor analyzed. I t is probable
that such analysis would have determined the origin of
the substance. The defendant did not call a witness to
testify that the entranceway had been swept the morning of the accident. These avenues of discovery are
open to the proprietors but not to the customers.
CONCLUSION
This case was properly submitted to the jury. There
was a reasonable basis in the evidence for the jury to
determine the defendant was negligent. The granting
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of the motion to dismiss notwithstading the verdict
should be reversed and judgment entered on the verdict
of the jury.
Respectfully submitted,
H O W A R D E. B A Y S I N G E R and
N E D WARNOCK
414 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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